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V. M.: Insurance--Questions in Application--Extent to Which Insured May

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
INSURANCE-QUESTIONS

IN

APPLICATIoN-EXTENT

TO

WHICH

insured, alleges
that to the question, "Has any insurer cancelled or refused to issue
automobile insurance to the applicant within the past three years?",
he answered in the affirmative, but that he was told by D's agent
that the question would be answered in the negative. D, insurer
now seeks to avoid payment under the policy on the basis of
fraudulent representatives in the application. Held, that where applicant for insurance imparts correct information but an agent of
the insurer without knowledge of applicant, records answers incorrectly, parol evidence may be introduced to show such facts, and
the acts of the agent under such circumstances are binding upon
the insurer; but it is otherwise if, as here, the applicant knows
that the facts are recorded falsely in the application. Christian v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 110 S.E.2d 845 (W. Va.
1959).
'he view expressed by the West Virginia Supreme Court states
with clarity and exactness a concept which had heretofore been
hinted at in a number of prior West Virginia decisions. The
factual situation in these previous cases generally involved insertion
by an agent of answers other than those given him by the insured
without the latter's knowledge. The court held that, in such a situation, the insurance company was estopped to deny liability under
the policy. Shinn v. West Virginia Ins. Co., 104 W. Va. 353, 140
S.E. 61 (1927); Schwarzbach v. Ohio Valley Protective Union,
25 W. Va. 622 (1885).
What the court has done in essence is to annex to the long
standing rule in this state, concerning such acts by an agent without the knowledge of the insured, an exception which allows the
insurer to avoid the policy where the insured is aware of the
falseness of the answer. This exception is apparently the general
view in the United States, but one which contains some very
important qualifications. Hadley v. New Hampshire Life Ins. Co.,
55 N.H. 110 (1875); Klieger Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 180 Wis.
320, 192 N.W. 1003 (1923); 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 732 (1946). In
two Ohio decisions the court spelled out basically the same rule
as expressed by the West Virginia court, but intimated that there
must be present the element of fraud and collusion between the
agent and the insured. The Ohio court stated that "in absence of
proof that applicant knew or should have known that the insurer was
being deceived, insurer cannot escape liability of a subsequently
INSURED MAY RELY UPON SUGGESTIONS OF AGENT.-P,
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issued policy." Sanders v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 Ohio 55, 151
N.E.2d 1 (1959); Pannuzion v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 168
Ohio 95, 151 N.E.2d. 545 (1959). The probable minority view was
set forth by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Rockford
Ins. Co. v. Cline, 72 Ill. 495 (1897), where it was held immaterial
that the insured also knew of the falseness of the answer inserted
by the agent
An interesting line of cases approach the problem from a slightly
different angle. In situations similar to the one under discussion,
some courts have approached the difficulty with a view toward
protecting the applicant. Here the agent of the insurer had interpreted the questions for and suggested answers to the insured. Consequently in Griego v. New York Life Ins. Co., 44 N.M. 830, 102
P.2d 81 (1940), the New Mexico court held that where the insurer's agent advises as to the propriety or necessity of recording
certain answers, it amounts to an interpretation of the question by
the insurer. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Shumaker, 178 Md. 189, 12
A.2d 681 (1940), follows this reasoning provided there exists good
faith on the part of the insured. The similarity between these cases
and the ones upon which the West Virginia holding is based is,
to say the least, thought provoking.
Both the Illinois view and the one expressed by the West Virginia court can, if strictly applied, result in hardships upon both
insurer and applicant. The former seems to leave the companies
open to collusion and fraud between agent and applicant while
the latter will require extreme caution in dealings with the agent.
The applicant will be at the mercy of agents who, in their zeal to
sell a policy, often make "on the spot" decisions as to what is necessary to properly answer the questions set forth in the application.
In the instant case it is a fair assumption that most people would
realize the importance of that specific question to his chance of
acquiring a policy, but many of the inquiries contained in applications are not so patently obvious in relation to their importance.
For example, many health and accident policy applications contain a question similar to this: "Have you consulted a Doctor and
why, within the last five years?", the purpose apparently being to
determine if the applicant has had any diseases within that period
which may affect his later health. If the prospective insured begins
to list the assorted small ailments which beset most individuals, and
is told by the agent that he need not list the minor ones, what is
the applicant to do? It is at once apparent that the applicant's
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position is precarious and uncertain. Further, it requires the applicant to determine what ailment is major and which is minor, a
situation which to one other than a physician would be to a large
extent conjecture. Probably the least desirable result would be
that the applicant would no longer be able to place his confidence
in the agent as he should be able to.
It seems to the writer that the rule under which this state has
brought itself does not recognize the real nature of an insurance
policy. The applicant and the agent are not involved in a bargain
and sale type negotiation in which each party tilts with the other
in order to obtain the advantage. But they are rather in a relationship of confidence as indicated by the language of one of the major
company's advertisements, "Consult your agent as you would your
attorney or physician". The extent to which the applicant may rely
upon the statement of the insurance company's representatives is
not a new question in this state. In 1936 the Supreme Court in the
case of Dickenson v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 117 W. Va. 812,
188 S.E. 378 (1936), posed the following question: "Does the
insured, who relies upon the information and opinion of a company
medical examiner, do so at his peril?" Since the point was not
briefed, the court supplied no answer, but, if driven to its logical
conclusion, the only answer one may discern from this latest
pronouncement would necessarily be in the affirmative.
J. G. V. M.
Acrvrrms As AFFECrING REQUmEUNION'S DUTy TO BARcAwN.-The union, representative
of insurance agents, while negotiating collective agreements with
LABOR LAW-UNROTECGrED

MENTS OF

the employer, sought to bring economic pressure upon the employer
by having its agent-members engage in concerted on-the-job activi-

ties, such as-refusing to solicit new business, reporting late at
offie s, and absenting themselves from special business conferences

arranged by the employer-designed to harass the employer. The
employer charged the union was refusing to bargain collectively;
whereupon the Board entered a cease-and-desist order against the
union. The circuit court set aside this order. On certiorari, the
Court held that the union's duty to bargain collectively in good

faith did not bar it from bringing to bear on the employer harassing
tactics of this nature and that their use by the union was of no

evidentiary significance. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, agreed that
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